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Bob Jones University v. United States
461 U.S. 574 (1983)

Governmental antidiscrimination objectives
and religious liberty concerns were pitted
against each other in Bob Jones University v.
United States, a 1983 U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that educational organizations
eligible for federal tax-exempt status may not
discriminate on the basis of race. In addition
to recognizing this antidiscrimination requirement, the Court rejected Bob Jones
University's claim that racially discriminatory
practices rooted in religious belief should be
exempted from Internal Revenue Service antidiscrimination regulations. In the context of
the Court's earlier decision in United States v.
Lee (1982) and subsequent decisions such as
Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. v. Roy (1986), Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988),
and Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990),
the Supreme Court's refusal to grant a special
exception from a generally applicable eligibility scheme to a religious organization was to
be expected. What made the Bob Jones
University decision especially noteworthy was
the political firestorm that surrounded the decision, thanks to Reagan administration efforts to moot the Bob Jones University
litigation by rescinding the IRS's antidiscrimination requirement.
Bob Jones University calls itself " the
world's most unusual university." Although
unaffiliated with any established church, the
university is dedicated to the teaching and
propagation of fundamentalist religious beliefs. In pursuit of these goals the university
dictates strict rules of conduct for its students.
To enforce one such rule forbidding interracial dating and marriage, the university denies
admission to applicants engaged in or known
to advocate interracial dating and marriage.
The Bob Jones University controversy
began in November 1970, when the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia in
Green v. Kennedy (D.C., 1970) enjoined the
IRS from according tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory private schools in
Mississippi. The Green court suggested that
the IRS would not be permitted to grant taxexempt status to institutions that violate the
government's public policy of nondiscrimination. The IRS then reversed its position of
granting tax exemptions to racially discrimina50
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tory institutions and notified the university
that it intended to challenge the tax-exempt
status of private schools that maintain racially
discriminatory admissions policies. In response, the university in 1971 sought to enjoin
the IRS from revoking its tax-exempt status.
That suit culminated in Bob Jones University
v. Simon, a 1974 Supreme Court decision that
"prohibited the University from obtaining judicial review by way of injunctive action before the assessment or collection of any tax."
The IRS in January 1976 formally revoked the university's tax exemption. After
paying a portion of the federal unemployment
taxes due, the university filed suit for a refund,
contending that it was statutorily and constitutionally entitled to reinstatement of its tax
exemption. In April 1981 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the revocation of the exemption. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Bob Jones
University and in Goldsboro Christian
Schools, Inc. v. United States, cases presenting
identical issues. On January 8, 1982, the
Justice Department petitioned the Court to
vacate these cases as moot in light of the
Reagan administration's decision to reinstate
the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools. Because of a related
court order that prevented the administration
from reinstating the tax-exempt status, however, the administration withdrew its request
that the Court declare the cases moot. On
May 24, 1983, the Supreme Court, by a vote
of 8 to 1, denied tax exemptions to the two
petitioner schools. In its decision the Court
made certain general pronouncements, both
on the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code's exemption provision and on the IRS's
authority to issue rulings in accordance with
its own interpretation of the code. The majority, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, held that a tax-exempt institution must confer some "public benefit" and
that its purpose must not be at odds with the
"common community conscience." The Court
further held that the IRS has broad authority
to interpret the code and to issue rulings based
on its interpretation.
The Court also considered the religious
liberty claims of Bob Jones University and
Goldsboro Christian Schools. Noting that the
"Government has a fundamental overriding
interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
education," the Court concluded that this

governmental interest "substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits" places on the exercise of religious belief.
By holding that equality of treatment on the
basis of race is the Constitution's most essential protection, and that the government's
broad interest in racial discrimination in education was at issue, the Court had little difficulty in disposing of the religious liberty
claims of Bob Jones University and Goldsboro
Christian Schools. In fact, the Court devoted
only three pages of its thirty-page opinion to
the religious liberty issue.
The Court, however, overstated the government interest as it applied to Bob Jones
University. Racial discrimination in education
(or public support of such discrimination) was
not the precise government interest at issue.
More accurately, the government interest is a
much more limited one, focusing on discriminatory policies applied by a religious school
for religious reasons. Moreover, unlike
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Bob Jones
University admitted both minority and nonminority students.
The Court's failure to treat Bob Jones
University'S religious liberty claim seriously or
to distinguish the religious liberty interests of
the two schools can probably be attributed
to the justices' efforts to make Bob Jones
University a case of great symbolic value.
Although the case initially was perceived as a
religious liberty lawsuit, the Reagan policy shift
transformed it into a socially significant racial
discrimination lawsuit. Indeed, although several
religious groups (including the American
Baptist Churches, United Presbyterian Church,
and National Association of Evangelicals) supported Bob Jones University's religious liberty
claim, the vast majority of amicus curiae filings-sometimes joined by religious interests
such as the American Jewish Committee-were
by civil rights organizations that strenuously
opposed Bob Jones University. Under these circumstances, the Court may have thought it best
to keep the focus of the case narrow and to
make the language about the evils of racial discrimination universal.
The Court should not be faulted too
much for this interpretation. Between nondiscrimination in education and religiously
inspired discrimination, the Court's endorsement of nondiscriminatory objectives is
hardly surprising. To give substantial attention to religious liberty concerns would-by
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making the case appear more complexindirectly limit the forcefulness of the Court's
embrace of equal educational opportunity.
In other words, the Court seemed to recognize the political impact of the decision and
thus spoke in general terms about the meaning of the tax-exemption provision of the
Internal Revenue Code and the evils of racial
discrimination.
Neal Devins
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